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Abstract: 
First introduced as a new protocol implemented in Chrome Canary for the Google Inc. Chrome browser, 
New Hope is engineered as a post-quantum key exchange for the TLS 1.2 protocol.  The structure of the 
exchange is a combination of elliptic curve enhancements along with revised lattice-based cryptography.  
New Hope incorporates the key-encapsulation mechanism of Peikert which itself is a modified Ring-LWE 
scheme.  The closest-vector problem is generated with an intersection of tesseract and hexadecachoron 
which results in the 24-cell V.  With respect to the density of the Voronoi cell V, the proposed mitigation 
against backdoor attacks proposed by the authors of New Hope only occurs against passive attacks.  We 
show that a backdoor as an active attack, formalized as an inversion oracle, is successful.  
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1  Introduction  
New Hope is a novel encryption scheme based on lattice cryptography and offers post-
quantum security within the key exchange.  New Hope uses a Montgomery form to reduce cost of 
implementation in terms of computational speed.  As a modification to elliptic curve cryptography 
New Hope instead reduces cost by sending an x-coordinate to compute the relative x-coordinate of 
any scalar [1].  Alkim, et al. implement a rounding function ⌊𝑥⌉ derived from the work of Peikert [2] 
to achieve equality with the floor function ⌊𝑥 + 1/2⌋.  This floor function is an element of integers.  
New Hope employs 𝑞 = 12289 and 𝑛 = 1024 as constraints of lattice 𝐷4, which results in a reduction of 
the modulus to 𝑞 = 12289 < 214 [1].  Peikert defines both the rounding and floor function of New Hope, 
using 𝛿 sub-Gaussian and zeta functions [2].  Peikert’s “canonical embedding” necessarily incorporates a 
homomorphic injective ring that maps (𝐾) to ℂ which fixes pointwise ℚ [2].  
The critical nature of an unbiased modular operation presents key values which are assumed to 
mitigate cryptanalysis.  Peikert recommends the use of small noise values to achieve this result while 
cautioning against cross-rounding given the determinacy that may result [2]. Any such determinacy 
negates an otherwise unbiased result.  It is here that New Hope diverges from its basis on Peikert’s work.  
The creators of New Hope outline a sketch to create a backdoor based on the trapdoor functions 
of NTRU.  The sketch outlined in New Hope is therefore a generalized example, rather than a proof of 
any such backdoor.  Keeping in mind that the authors of New Hope have engineered a bare protocol 
aimed at mitigating passive attacks, we thus propose an active attack using the generalized form provided 
in [1].   Concerns of a backdoor capability extended to New Hope will now be addressed in detail, treating 
Alice and Bob as server and client, respectively, with malicious attacker, Oscar.  We first begin with 
generalized parameters and functions associated with Alice.  
2  Parameters  
The parameter of (𝑎), fixed or otherwise, may potentially facilitate constructing a backdoor.  The 
values of (𝑎) are a function of the initial setup with respect to the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM).  
For mildly small values of (𝑓, 𝑔) when 𝑓 = 𝑔, 𝑓 = 1 mod 𝑝 for some prime (𝑝 ≥ 4 ∗ 16 + 1) there is a 
point of weakness within the function 𝑎 = 𝑔
1
𝑓
mod 𝑞.  With respect to (𝑎, 𝑏 = 𝑎𝑠 + 𝑒), it is possible to 
compute [𝑏𝑓 =  𝑎𝑓𝑠 +  𝑓𝑒 =  𝑔𝑠 +  𝑓𝑒 mod 𝑞] such that [𝑏𝑓 =  𝑔𝑠 +  𝑓𝑒 mod 𝑞].  The KEM begins 
with a generator (𝑎) produced by Alice and encapsulation of (𝑎, 𝑏) by Bob.  Alice sends a ring element 
as message (𝑏) to which Bob replies (𝑢, 𝑟).    The reconciliation function denoted as rec(𝑤, 𝑏) when 
applied to polynomials treats each coefficient independently. 
For Oscar to succeed with inversion, he uses 𝑠(𝑤) as the reconciliation function defined in [1], 
though treating 𝑤 independent of 𝑏.  With small enough (𝑔, 𝑠, 𝑓, 𝑒), computing 𝑔𝑠 + 𝑓𝑒 ∈ ℤ once (𝑠 mod 
𝑞) is obtained proves the scheme is then corrupted.  After establishing 𝑡 = 𝑠 + 𝑒 mod 𝑝, with respect to 
coefficients of (𝑠) and (𝑒) smaller than (16), values (𝑠, 𝑒) have sums within the range (−2 ∗ 16, 2 ∗ 16).  
Knowing the values of (𝑠, 𝑒) within the range of (−2 ∗ 16, 2 ∗ 16) in terms of mod 𝑝 ≥ 4 ∗ 16 + 1 is 
knowing them in ℤ. 
The backdoor relies on the pseudo-inverse of a polynomial (𝑝, 𝑃 ∈ 𝒫), 𝑃 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑠 ≡ 𝑠 mod 𝑞 
for any polynomial (𝑠 ∈ 𝒫) such that 𝑠(1) ≡  0 mod 𝑞.  If the secret key equation can be modified to 
equal 𝑡 ≡ ℎ𝑣 + 𝑤 mod 𝑞, it is feasible to apply a pseudo-inversion.  For a detailed analysis of 
inversion oracles refer to the primary source of Mol and Yung [3].  Through implementing the attack 
developed in [3], it is possible to demonstrate a backdoor exists against New Hope.  This occurs as 
an active attack by Oscar against Alice.  We now turn to Alice’s ring element (𝑢𝑠 = 𝑎𝑠𝑠′ + 𝑒′𝑠), and 
ring element (𝑣 = 𝑏𝑠′ + 𝑒′′ = 𝑎𝑠𝑠′ + 𝑒𝑠′ + 𝑒′′).   
3  Inversion  
Given the new secret key equation derived from [3], let the following hold.  Let (𝑤 = 𝑢 − 𝑔), 
(𝑣 = 𝐹) for 𝑡 ≡ 𝑢 − 𝑝𝑞 ∗ ℎ(mod 𝑞), and (𝑣 = 𝑢 – 𝐹), (𝑤 = 𝑔) for 𝑡 ≡ 𝑝𝑞ℎ + ℎ𝑢(mod 𝑞).  In both cases, 
(𝑤, 𝑣) are binary.  An oracle will output the correct key pair only when 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸𝑞,ℎ
𝑑𝑟  [3].  To apply this 
inversion the anti-derivative of the Peikert scheme used by New Hope must be established.  Per the 
authors of New Hope, the implementation of the key encapsulation method (KEM) relies on 
pseudorandom ring elements exchanged between Alice and Bob which are then used to derive the 
session key [1].  The reconciliation function is rec(𝑤, 𝑏) such that: 
rec(𝑤, 𝑏) = {
0, if  𝑤 ∈ 𝐼𝑏 + 𝐸(mod 𝑞)
1, otherwise
 
The authors of New Hope set as parameters of the polynomial ring ℛ𝑞 =
ℤ𝑞[𝑋]
𝑋𝑛+1
.  The 
message sent by Alice is denoted as (𝑏), while Bob’s response is (𝑢, 𝑟) with each an element of the 
ring 𝑅𝑞.  The polynomial 𝑎 ∈ ℛ𝑞 is public and constant in NTRU schemes, though New Hope does 
not use fixed values.  To generate the function which results in (𝑠 mod 𝑞), the algebraic 
manipulation itself is straightforward. 
To begin deriving the necessary function to generate the secret key for an NTRU scheme, a 
pre-established value equal to (𝑠 mod 𝑞) is introduced:  
𝑎𝑠 − 𝑠 ∗ (
1
𝑎
− 1) = 𝑠 mod 𝑞 
Via substitution, values of the variables (𝑎, 𝑏) already provided are used to calculate values of 𝑡. 
(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑎𝑠 + 𝑒 
𝑎𝑠 − 𝑠 = 𝑏 − 𝑡 
After trivial algebraic manipulations, the values of 𝑡 can be equated to a set of equations, wherein 
the value of the constant (𝑎) can be substituted with previously afforded values given in [1], at which 
point they are no longer fixed. 
𝑡 = {
−𝑎𝑠 + 𝑠 + 𝑏
𝑠 + 𝑒 mod 𝑝
 
Returning to the equations used to calculate 𝑡, new values of 𝑡 are now substituted and the two previous 
equations are calculated as equal. 
((𝑎𝑠 − 𝑠) ∗ (
1
𝑎
− 1) = (𝑏 − 𝑡) ∗ (
1
𝑎
− 1)) 
Where (𝑎 = 𝑓𝑔−1 mod 𝑞) it is then possible to assert (𝑎𝑠 − 𝑠 + 𝑡 = 𝑏), which in turn produces the 
primary equation for solving the value of 𝑠 mod 𝑞. 
By producing an equation that results in a required value for a backdoor attack against some 
NTRU lattice-based cryptography, the equation of ((𝑎𝑠 − 𝑠) ∗ (
1
𝑎−1
) = 𝑠 mod 𝑞) generates the final 
steps to calculating the secret 𝑠.  Using substitution yet again, but this time of the variable 𝑎 being no 
longer fixed, one derives: 
((𝑓𝑔−1 mod 𝑞)𝑠 − 𝑠) ∗ (
1
𝑓𝑔−1mod 𝑞 − 1
) = 𝑠 mod 𝑞 
By simplifying this equation, we then produce: 
(𝑓𝑔−1 mod 𝑞)𝑠 − 𝑠
(𝑓𝑔−1 mod 𝑞) − 1
= 𝑠 mod 𝑞 
Stating the division in an alternate form, one then has: 
𝑠 = 𝑠 mod 𝑞 
The value of the variable (𝑞) is itself equivalent to 1 mod 2𝑛.  Bearing in mind that 𝑛 = 1024, it 
is known that 𝑞 ≡ 1 mod 2048.  The anti-derivative, or indefinite integral pertinent to our analysis is 
defined as the variable 𝑎 which is equal to 𝑓𝑔−1 mod 𝑞, resulting in the equation: 
∫
(𝑓
1
𝑔 mod 𝑞) 𝑠 − 𝑠
(𝑓
1
𝑔 mod 𝑞) − 1
d𝑔 = 𝑔𝑠 + constant 
Returning to the exchange between Alice and Bob, Alice uses the equation (𝑢𝑠 = 𝑎𝑠𝑠′ + 𝑒′𝑠) to send 
Bob a message, while Bob uses the equation (𝑣 = 𝑏𝑠′ + 𝑒′′ = 𝑎𝑠𝑠′ + 𝑒𝑠′ + 𝑒′′) to reconcile the pair.  If 
the equation of 𝑠 = 𝑠 mod 𝑞 can be shown to equal (𝑡 ≡ ℎ𝑣 + 𝑤(mod 𝑞)), then an oracle output to break 
the encryption is feasible.  The further constraint of (𝑒 ∈ 𝐸𝑞,ℎ
𝑑𝑟 ) is also required.  Returning to the values 
produced by (𝑡), let (𝑡) remain equal to the following: 
𝑡 = {
−𝑎𝑠 + 𝑠 + 𝑏
𝑠 + 𝑒 mod 𝑝
 
To satisfy the constraint of the variable (𝑒) as a member of (𝐸𝑞,ℎ
𝑑𝑟 ) and with the value of (𝑞) 
known, one can substitute for (𝑒) accordingly.  Where (𝑑𝑟) corresponds to the Hamming weights to 
produce an inversion oracle against NTRU [3], New Hope employs a weight value of exp (
−𝑥2
2𝜎2
) to all 
integers (𝑥) such that there is no fixed value for (𝑎), but rather each coefficient of (𝑎) is chosen 
uniformly at random from ℤ𝑞 [1].  The discrete Gaussian distribution (𝐷ℤ,𝜎) is parametrized by the 
Gaussian parameter (𝜎 ∈ ℝ) defined by the previously mentioned weight of all (𝑥).  The values of ℤ𝑞 for 
an integer 𝑞 > 1 must be within the quotient ring 
ℤ
𝑞ℤ
 such that ℛ =
ℤ[𝑋]
𝑋𝑛+1
 is the ring of integer polynomials 
modulo 𝑋𝑛 + 1 where each coefficient is reduced modulo (𝑞). 
4 Analysis 
With the intersection Voronoi 𝒱 24-cell treated as a convex polytope, the 16-cell ℓ1-ball is a 
simplicial polytope while the ℓ∞-ball together with the 16-cell are the only regular Euclidean 4-space 
tessellations.  Given these parameters, the 24-cell constructed as a Voronoi tessellation having center at 
𝐷4 for any point 𝑥 is expressed as: 
𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℤ
4: ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑖
≡ 0 mod 2 
If, for any 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑠  there is some point where 𝑠(1) ≡ 0mod 𝑞, the introduction of an inversion oracle is 
then verified. 
Treating the lattice 𝐷2̃ as a binary field extension of the approximate x-coordinates, the binary 
field characteristic is thus two given the use of a Montgomery form for optimization of [1].  This 
characteristic of two implies that the binary field extension has order 2𝑛 for 𝑛.  Given 𝑞 = 12289 is 
equivalent to 𝑞 ≡ 1 mod 2𝑛, any treatment of the Voronoi cell in terms of the reduced lattice 𝐷2̃ must 
necessarily commute to the lattice in 4 dimensions.  This occurs within any Boolean ring of characteristic 
two.  Bearing in mind that once an attacker can compute: 
[(𝑏 − 𝑡) ∗ (𝑎 − 1)−1 = (𝑎𝑠 − 𝑠) ∗ (𝑎 − 1)−1] 
= 
𝑠 mod 𝑞 
the attacker can then recover the secret key.  We believe we have demonstrated such a calculation of 
𝑠 mod 𝑞, leaving only the treatment of e to be demonstrated. 
We begin by treating e over the range of x-coordinates.  For 𝑏 = 𝑎𝑠 + 𝑒, we easily derive −𝑒 =
𝑎𝑠
𝑏
.  For the characteristic two, any element is also its additive inverse, thus 𝑒 =
𝑎𝑠
𝑏
.  Substituting the value 
of e for Voronoi coordinates x, we then find 𝑥 =
𝑎𝑠
𝑏
 is equivalent to 𝑥 =
(𝑎𝑠+𝑒)𝑠
𝑎𝑠+𝑒
 as previously 
demonstrated.  This trivially reduces to 𝑥 = 𝑠, but more importantly results in 𝑥 − 𝑠 = 0.  Using the 
property of additive inverse again, we then rephrase the equation as −𝑠 − 𝑠 = 0.  Thus, −2𝑠 = 0.  
Returning to mod 𝑞, as derived, we may reduce the equation −2𝑠 = 0 with respect to modulo q.  The 
inversion constraints of (𝑣 = 𝑢 − 𝑓) and (𝑤 = 𝑔) with respect to 𝑡 ≡ ℎ𝑣 + 𝑤 mod(𝑞), (𝑤, 𝑣) are 
adjusted via substitutions of w for g, and v with 𝑢 − 𝑓.  We then return to the equivalent form of 𝑠 mod 𝑞 
and derive: 
(𝑓𝑤−1 mod 𝑞)𝑠 − 𝑠
(𝑓𝑤−1 mod 𝑞) − 1
 
To continue we replace 𝑢 − 𝑓 with 𝑢 − 𝑓 = 𝑢 − 𝑓 and then simply subtract u from each side, 
leaving −𝑓 = −𝑓.  By additive inverse, we then have 𝑓 = 𝑓 and may proceed as before.  Using the 
pseudo-inverse polynomial (𝑃, 𝑝) we proceed by using the expression 𝑠 mod 𝑞 congruent to 𝑃 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑠.  
Allowing the polynomial 𝑝 as an element of the ring 𝑅𝑞, and deriving 𝑢 via substitution of 𝑣 = 𝑢 − 𝑓 as 
done for 𝑓 we may begin constructing the expression congruent to 𝑡 by adding 𝑝𝑞 and 𝑢. 
We now must demonstrate recovery (𝑠, 𝑒) with respect to the range mod 𝑝 ≥ 4 ∗ 16 + 1.  Having isolated 
𝑥 equal to 𝑠 and then showing −2𝑠 = 0, we apply the additive inverse to produce −𝑠 − 𝑠 = 𝑠 + 𝑠. 
We now have 𝑠 + 𝑠 = 0 = 𝑠(1 + 1).  For a coefficient of x resulting in 𝑒 mod 𝑝, the weight of 
exp
−𝑥2
2𝜎2
 then satisfies the constraint of 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸𝑞,ℎ
𝑑𝑟 .  Knowing 𝑡 = 𝑠 + 𝑒 mod 𝑝, and with knowledge of 
public key h, we then compute ℎ𝑣 + 𝑤 mod 𝑞.  Allowing 𝑞 = 2, per the constraint of values ℤ𝑞 for 𝑞 > 1 
with respect to 𝑓 = 1 mod 𝑝, let [𝑠 = 𝑠 mod 𝑞 ≡ 𝑠 mod 2].  Using rec(𝑤, 𝑏) as a function of s, 
𝑠(𝑤): 𝐼𝑏 + 𝐸(mod 𝑞), assume a zero is returned.  The function 𝑠(𝑤), for any instance in which the output 
is not zero then results in a value of 1 being returned for 𝑠(𝑤) during reconciliation.  Having shown 𝑥 =
𝑠, and with knowledge of b as values of (a,s,e) we may substitute values as demonstrated in this work to 
isolate: 𝑠(1) = 𝑠 = 𝑠 mod q = 𝑠 mod 2 ≡ 0 mod 2. 
6 Conclusion 
With the values of (𝑒, 𝑠) available to Oscar and leveraged against Alice, Oscar can maintain 
persistence within the network.  New Hope largely avoids any issues this may cause by specifically using 
ephemeral 𝑎, but does allow temporary caching of 𝑎 with respect to Alice should the costs of generating 
unique 𝑎 become too great [1].  Considering this, it should be stated that if Oscar’s inversion succeeds, 
his ability to access Alice’s cached 𝑎 hinges on knowing when caching occurs, and what value of 𝑎 is 
required.  This continues to present a significant challenge. 
The anti-derivative provided opens the possibility to manipulate the secret (𝑠) while 
simultaneously using the variable (𝑔) substituted for (𝑥) in addition to some constant.  This constant 
added to the variables (𝑠, 𝑔) based upon the traditionally fixed value of NTRU, though applied against 
New Hope facilitates an inversion of the scheme.  The vectors of (𝑥) and relative approximate 
coordinates are shown equivalent to 𝑒 for known s.  Under this model, Oscar can compromise the 
generation of (𝑒, 𝑠), and use these values to introduce an arbitrary constant. 
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